

Division of Labour

The Division of Labour in Society (French: *De la division du travail social*) is the doctoral dissertation of French sociologist Émile Durkheim, published in 1893. It was influential in advancing sociological theories and thought, with ideas which in turn were influenced by Auguste Comte. **Durkheim described how social order was maintained in societies based on two very different forms of solidarity (mechanical and organic), and the transition from more "primitive" societies to advanced industrial societies.**

Durkheim suggested that in a "primitive" society, *mechanical solidarity*, with people acting and thinking alike and with a collective or common conscience, is what allows social order to be maintained. In such a society, Durkheim viewed crime as an act that "offends strong and defined states of the collective conscience" though he viewed crime as a normal social fact.^[1] Because social ties were relatively homogeneous and weak throughout society, the **law had to be repressive and penal**, to respond to offences of the common conscience.

In an advanced, industrial, capitalist society, the complex division of labor means that people are allocated in society according to merit and rewarded accordingly: social inequality reflects natural inequality, assuming that there is complete equity in the society. Durkheim argued that moral regulation was needed, as well as economic regulation, to maintain order (or *organic solidarity*) in society with people able to "compose their differences peaceably".^[2] In this type of society, **law would be more restitutive than penal**, seeking to restore rather than punish excessively.

He thought that transition of a society from "primitive" to advanced may bring about major disorder, crisis, and anomie. However, once society has reached the "advanced" stage, it becomes much stronger and is done developing. Unlike Karl Marx, Durkheim did not foresee any different society arising out of the industrial capitalist division of labour. He regards conflict, chaos, and disorder as pathological phenomena to modern society, whereas Marx highlights class conflict.

An Overview of the book by Emile Durkheim



By Ashley Crossman

The Division of Labor in Society is a book written, originally in French, by Emile Durkheim in 1893. It was Durkheim's first major published work and the one in which he introduced the concept of *anomie*, or the breakdown of the influence of social norms on individuals within a society. At the time, *The Division of Labor in Society* was influential in advancing sociological theories and thought.

In *The Division of Labor in Society*, Durkheim discusses how the division of labor is beneficial for society because it **increases the reproductive capacity**, the skill of the workman, and it creates a **feeling of solidarity between people**. The division of labor goes beyond economic interests; it also establishes **social and moral order within a society**.

There are two kinds of social solidarity, according to Durkheim: mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. **Mechanical solidarity** connects the individual to society without any intermediary.

That is, society is organized collectively and all members of the group share the same beliefs. The bond that binds the individual to society is this collective conscious, this shared belief system.

With **organic solidarity**, on the other hand, society is a system of different functions that are united by definite relationships. Each individual must have a distinct job or action and a personality that is his or her own. Individuality grows as parts of society grow. Thus, society becomes more efficient at moving in sync, yet at the same time, each of its parts has more movements that are distinctly its own.

According to Durkheim, the more primitive a society is, the more it is characterized by mechanical solidarity.

The members of that society are more likely to resemble each other and share the same beliefs and morals. As societies become more advanced and civilized, the individual members of those societies start to become more unique and distinguishable from each other. Solidarity becomes more organic as these societies develop their divisions of labor.

Durkheim also discusses **law** extensively in this book. To him, law is the most visible symbol of social solidarity and the organization of social life in its most precise and stable form. Law plays a part in society that is analogous to the nervous system in organisms, according to Durkheim. The nervous system regulates various body functions so they work together in harmony. Likewise, the legal system regulates all the parts of society so that they work together in agreement.

Two types of law exist and each corresponds to a type of social solidarity. The first type of law, **repressive law**, imposes some type of punishment on the perpetrator. Repressive law corresponds to the 'center of common consciousness' and tends to stay diffused throughout society. Repressive law corresponds to the mechanical state of society.

The second type of law is **restitutive law**, which does not necessarily imply any suffering on the part of the perpetrator, but rather tries to restore the relationships that were disturbed from their normal form by the crime that occurred. Restitutive law corresponds to the organic state of society and works through the more specialized bodies of society, such as the courts and lawyers. This also means that repressive law and restitutory law vary directly with the degree of a society's development. Repressive law is common in primitive, or mechanical, societies where sanctions for crimes are typically made across the whole community. In these lower societies, crimes against the individual are common, yet placed on the lower end of the penal ladder. Crimes against the community take priority because the evolution of the collective conscious is widespread and strong while the division of labor has not yet happened. The more a society becomes civilized and the division of labor is introduced, the more restitutory law takes place.

Durkheim bases his discussion of organic solidarity on a dispute with Herber Spencer, who claimed that industrial solidarity is spontaneous and that there is no need for a coercive body to create or maintain it. Spencer believed that social harmony is simply established by itself and Durkheim disagrees. Much of this book, then, is Durkheim arguing with Spencer's stance and pleading his own views on the topic.

Durkheim also spends some time discussing division of labor and how it is caused. To him, the division of labor is in direct proportion to the moral density of the society. **This increase can happen in three ways: through an increase of the concentration of people spatially, through the growth of towns, or through an increase in the number and efficacy of the means of communication.** When one or more of these things happen, labor starts to become divided because the struggle for existence becomes more strenuous.

(References: Durkheim, E. (1997). The Division of Labor in Society. New York, NY: Free Press.)

According to Giddens (p. 73), the main substantive problem for Durkheim stems from "an apparent moral ambiguity concerning the relationship between the individual and society in the contemporary world." On the one hand, with specialization and the highly developed division of labour, individuals develop their own consciousness, and are encouraged in this specialization. On the other hand, there are also moral ideas encouraging people to be well rounded, of

service to society as a whole. These two seem contradictory, and Durkheim is concerned with finding the historical and sociological roots of each of these, along with how these two seemingly contradictory moral guidelines are reconciled in modern society.

This book can also be read with a view to illuminating Durkheim's methods. In the first chapter, he outlines his method, and the theory which could be falsified. By looking at morality, he is not pursuing a philosophical course, mainly in the realm of ideas. Durkheim is critical of "moral philosophers [who] begin either from some *a priori* postulate about the essential characteristics of human nature, or from propositions taken from psychology, and thence proceed by deduction to work out a scheme of ethics." (Giddens, p. 72). That is, Durkheim is attempting to determine the roots of morality by studying society, and changes in society. These forms of morality are social facts, and data from society must be obtained, and these used to discover causes. The data used by Durkheim are observable, empirical forms of data in the form of laws, institutions (legal and other), norms and behaviour. In this book, Durkheim adopts a non-quantitative approach, but in *Suicide* his approach is more quantitative.

In examining the roots of social solidarity, Durkheim regards the examination of systems of law as an important means of understanding morality. He regards "systems of law" as the "externalization of the inner core of social reality (solidarity), it is predicted that as the inner core undergoes qualitative changes from 'mechanical' to 'organic' solidarity, there should be manifest shift in the ratio of types of legal systems ... as a proportion of the total legal corpus." (Tiryakian in Bottomore and Nisbet, p. 214)

Since law reproduces the principal forms of social solidarity, we have only to classify the different types of law to find therefrom the different types of social solidarity which correspond to it. (*Division*, p. 68).

Giddens notes that Durkheim is "attempting to measure changes in the nature of social solidarity. Since social solidarity is ... not directly measurable, it follows that in order to chart the changing form of moral solidarity 'we must substitute for the internal fact which escapes us an external index ... which symbolizes it.' Such an index can be found in legal codes. From this, Durkheim begins to build a proof of the division of labour as the basis for the different forms of solidarity. He then attempts to show the nature of society, how it changes over time, and how this results in the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity.

1. Mechanical Solidarity

Early societies tended to be small scale and relatively simple, with little division of labour or only a **simple division of labour by age and sex**. In this type of society, people are **very similar to each other**, and Durkheim titles this chapter "Mechanical solidarity through likeness." In this type of society, each person carries out essentially similar types of tasks, so that people share the type of work they carry out. These societies are characterized by likeness, in which the members of the **society share the same values, based on common tasks and common life situations and experiences**.

In these early societies, Durkheim argues that **legal codes or the system of law tends to be repressive law or penal law. If there is a crime in this society, then this crime stands as an offense to all, because it is an offense to the common morality, the shared system of values that exists**. Most people feel the offense, and regardless of how serious it is, severe punishment is likely to be meted out for it. Zeitlin notes (p. 264):

Anything that offends the common conscience threatens the solidarity – the very existence of society. An offense left unpunished weakens to that degree the social unity. Punishment therefore serves the important function of restoring and reconstituting social unity.

Penal law is concerned with sanctions only, and there is no mention of obligations. **Punishment is severe, perhaps death or dismemberment**. Moral obligation and duty is not stated in the punishment, because this is generally understood. Rather the punishment is given, and that is the completion of the penalty.

Some of the following quotes from *The Division of Labor in Society* show the nature of Durkheim's argument: In the quotes, note that **the act is criminal because the act offends the collective conscience**. For Durkheim, the collective consciousness reaches all parts of society, has a distinct reality and is independent of individual conditions, and is passed on from one generation to the next. In this, it differs from particular or individual consciences. (*Division*, pp. 79-80).

Collective Consciousness. the only common characteristic of all crimes is that they consist ... in acts universally disapproved of by members of each society. (*Division*, p. 73).

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the *collective* or *common conscience*. (*Division*, p. 79)

An act is criminal when it offends strong and defined states of the collective conscience. (*Division*, p. 80)

We must not say that an action shocks the common conscience because it is criminal, but rather that it is criminal because it shocks the common conscience. We do not reprove it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it. (*Division*, p. 81).

Referring to repressive or penal forms of punishment in early society, Durkheim notes that it may extend to:

the innocent, his wife, his children, his neighbours, etc. This is because the passion which is the soul of punishment ceases only when exhausted. If, therefore, after it has destroyed the one who has immediately called it forth, there still remains force within it, it expands in quite mechanical fashion. (*Division*, p. 86).

In contrast, modern legal codes are quite different, with punishment being less important. Instead, society is concerned with restoration of the original situation, rather than exacting revenge on the offender. "But today, it is said, punishment has changed its character; it is no longer to avenge itself that society punishes, it is to defend itself." (*Division*, p. 86).

This distinction between different types of legal codes and punishment may provide a means of noting what mechanical solidarity means.

Mechanical Solidarity. They must re-enforce themselves by mutual assurances that they are always agreed. The only means for this is action in common. In short, since it is the common conscience which is attacked, it must be that which resists, and accordingly the resistance must be collective. (*Division*, p. 103).

(Thus, the analysis of punishment confirms our definition of crime. We began by establishing inductively that crime consisted essentially in an act contrary to strong and defined states of the common conscience. We have just seen that all the qualities of punishment ultimately derive from this nature of crime. That is because the rules that it sanctions express the most essential social likeness.)

Thus we see what type of solidarity penal law symbolizes. ... not only are all the members of the group individually attracted to one another because they resemble one another, but also because they are joined to what is the condition of existence of this collective type. ... They will as they will themselves, hold to it durably and for prosperity, because, without it, a great part of their psychic lives would function poorly. (*Division*, p. 105).

These quotes show how the collective consciousness works in societies without a highly developed division of labour. The primary function of punishment, therefore, is to protect and reaffirm the *conscience collective* in the face of acts which question its sanctity. In order to carry this out, such societies develop forms of repressive or penal law.

While the common values in these societies can change over time, this process of change is generally quite slow, so that these values are generally appropriate for the historical period in question. At other times, the laws may be inappropriate, and might be maintained only through force. However, Durkheim generally considers this to be an exceptional circumstance, and one that is overcome.

2. Organic Solidarity

With the development of the division of labour, the collective consciousness begins to decline. Each individual begins to have a separate set of tasks which he or she is engaged in. These different situations lead to quite a different set of experiences for each individual. This set of experiences tends to lead toward "a 'personal consciousness,' with an emphasis on individual distinctiveness." (Grabb, p.81). The common situation which created the common collective consciousness is disturbed, and individuals no longer have common experiences, but have a great variety of different settings, each leading towards its own consciousness.

As the development of the division of labour erodes the collective consciousness, it also creates a new form of solidarity. This new form is organic solidarity, and is characterized by dependence of individuals on each other within the division of labour, and by a certain form of cooperation. There is a

functional interdependence in the division of labour. ... Organic solidarity ... presupposes not identity but *difference* between individuals in their beliefs and actions. The growth of organic solidarity and the expansion of the division of labour are hence associated with increasing individualism. (Giddens, p. 77).

Cuff et al. (p.31) note that this means that "differences are expected and indeed become expected. ... Thus the nature of the moral consensus changes. Commonly shared values still persist because without them there would be no society, but they become generalized, as they are not rooted in the totality of commonly shared daily experiences. Instead of specifying the details of an action, common values tend to be a more general underpinning for social practices. It is in this sense that the division of labour can be seen as a moral phenomenon."

Thus Durkheim argues that there are individual, and probably group, differences, at the same time as there is a new form of social solidarity.

Organic Solidarity. There are in each of us , ... two consciences: one which is common to our group in its entirety, which, consequently, is not our self, but society living and acting within us; the other, on the contrary, represents that in us which is personal and distinct, that which makes us an individual. Solidarity which comes from likeness is at its maximum when the collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience and coincides in all points with it.

Durkheim speaks of the centripetal and centrifugal forces, and draws an organic analogy:

Individuality is something which the society possesses. Thus , .. personal rights are not yet distinguished from real rights. (*Division* , 129-30).

It is quite otherwise with the solidarity which the division of labour produces. Whereas the previous type implies that individuals resemble each other, this type presumes their difference. The first is possible only in so far as the individual personality is absorbed into the collective personality; the second is possible only if each one has a sphere of action which is peculiar to him; that is, a personality. ... In effect, on the one hand, each one depends as much more strictly on society as labor is more divided; and, on the other, the activity of each is as much more personal as it is more specialized. ... Society becomes more capable of collective movement, at the same time that each of its elements has more freedom of movement. The solidarity resembles that which we observe among the higher animals. Each organ, in effect, has its special physiognomy, its autonomy. And moreover, the unity of the organism is as great as the individuation of the parts is more

marked. Because of this analogy, we propose to call the solidarity which is due to the division of labour, organic. (*Division*, 131).

In the structure of societies with organic solidarity (quote 8):

Social Structure. They are constituted, not by a repetition of similar, homogeneous segments, but by a system of different organs each of which has a special role, and which are themselves formed of differentiated parts. Not only are social elements not of the same nature, but they are not arranged in the same manner. They are not juxtaposed linearly ... but entwined one with another, but co-ordinated and subordinated one to another around the same central organ which exercises a moderating action over the rest of the organism. (*Division*, p.181).

Organic Solidarity and Restitutive Law. "The progressive displacement of repressive by restitutive law is an historical trend which is correlated with the degree of development of a society: the higher the level of social development, the greater the relative proportion of restitutive law within the judicial structure." (Giddens, p. 76). For Durkheim, this form of law is concerned with "a simple *return in state*. Sufferance proportionate to the misdeed is not inflicted on the one who has violated the law or who disregards it; he is simply sentenced to comply with it." The judge "speaks of law; he says nothing of punishment." (*Division*, p 111).

As the division of labour develops, people do not have the same consciousness, so that the form of law must change. "The very existence of restitutive law, in fact, presupposes the prevalence of a differentiated division of labour, since it covers the rights of individuals either over private property, or over other individuals who are in a different social position from themselves." (Giddens, p. 76) Along with this could come Weber's rational law, perhaps much the same as Durkheim's restitutive law. Systematic codes governing exchange and contracts are necessary, but these are the result of the general acceptance of individual rights within the system of a division of labour.

Cause of Organic Solidarity. Durkheim is critical of the economists who regard the development of the division of labour as a result of the coming together of people with different abilities and specialties. While Durkheim did not make reference to Adam Smith, he also may have had in mind Smith's view that people have a natural propensity to truck, barter and trade. Finally, he was critical of the economists' point of view that merely examined the technical conditions for the division of labour, and the increased efficiency associated with it, without consideration of the broader societal conditions necessary to

maintain it. Thus Durkheim did not consider the division of labour as a natural condition.

Durkheim considers the development of the division of labour to be associated with the increasing contact among people. There is a greater density of contact, so that people are led to specialize. The division of labour emerges in different ways in different societies, leading to somewhat different forms of solidarity. However, it is these developments which create the division of labour and "Civilization develops because it cannot fail to develop." (*Division*, p. 337).

But this moral relationship can only produce its effect if the real distance between individuals has itself diminished in some way. Durkheim refers to this an increasing density. Moral density cannot grow unless material density grows at the same time. The two are inseparable though. Three ways in which this happens are:

i. Concentration of people. People begin to concentrate together. Agriculture may begin this, and it continues with the growth of cities as well.

ii. Cities. Formation of cities and their development. "Cities always result from the need of individuals to put themselves in very intimate contact with others. They are so many points where the social mass is contracted more strongly than elsewhere. They can multiply and extend only if the moral density is raised." (*Division*, p. 258).

iii. Transportation and Communication. Increased number and rapidity of means of transportation and communication. This results in "suppressing or diminishing the gaps separating social segments, they increase the density of society." (*Division*, pp. 259-260).

The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous. (Division, 262).

We say, not that the growth and condensation of societies *permit*, but that they *necessitate* a greater division of labor. It is not an instrument by which the latter is realized; it is its determining cause. (*Division*, p. 262).

As a result of this greater contact, the "struggle for existence becomes more acute" and this results in the development of the division of labour. If needs are the same, then there is always a struggle for existence. But where different interests can be pursued, then there may be room for all. Quote 8:

Social Structure (2nd part) In the same city, different occupations can co-exist without being obliged mutually to destroy one another, for they pursue different objects. ... Each of them can attain his end without preventing the others from attaining theirs.

The closer functions come to one another, however, the more points of contact they have; the more, consequently, are they exposed to conflict. ... The judge never is in competition with the business man, but the brewer and the wine-grower ... often try to supplant each other. As for those who have exactly the same function, they can forge ahead only to the detriment of others. (*Division*, p. 267).

In proportion to the segmental character of the social constitution, each segment has its own organs, protected and kept apart from like organs by divisions separating the different segments. ... But, no matter how this substitution is made, it cannot fail to produce advances in the course of specialization. (*Division*, 269).

Instead of entering into or remaining in competition, two similar enterprises establish equilibrium by sharing their common task. Instead of one being subordinate to the other, they co-ordinate. But, in all cases, new specialties appear. (*Division*, 270).

For Durkheim the result of the division of labour is positive in that there is no need to compete in the sense of struggling just to survive. Rather, the division of labour may signify that there are sufficient material resources for all in society, and this division allows a certain form of co-operation. Quote 9:

Division of Labour. The division of labour is, then, a result of the struggle for existence, but is a mellowed *dénouement*. Thanks to it, opponents are not obliged to fight to a finish, but can exist one beside the other. Also, in proportion to its development, it furnishes the means of maintenance and survival to a greater number of individuals who, in more homogeneous societies, would be condemned to extinction. (*Division*, p. 271).

The division of labour cannot be anticipated, in terms of the form of its development. It is the sharing of functions, but not according to a preconceived plan. "The division of labour, then, must come about of itself and progressively." (**Division**, p. 276). It must come to pass in a pre-existing society (Appendix quote 9).

Division of Labour. Work is not divided among independent and already differentiated individuals who by uniting and associating bring together their different aptitudes. For it would be a miracle if differences thus born through chance circumstance could unite so perfectly as to form a coherent whole. Far from preceding collective life, they derive from it. They can be produced only in the midst of a society, and under the pressure of social sentiments and social needs. That is what makes them essentially harmonious. ... there are societies whose cohesion is essentially due to a community of beliefs and sentiments, and it is from these societies that those whose unity is assured by the division of labour have emerged. (*Division*, p. 277).

Civilization is itself the necessary consequence of the changes which are produced in the volume and in the density of societies. If science, art, and economic activity develop, it is in accordance with a necessity which is imposed upon men. It is because there is, for them, no other way of living in the new conditions in which they have been placed. From the time that the number of individuals among whom social relations are established begins to increase, they can maintain themselves only by greater specialization, harder work, and intensification of their faculties. From this general stimulation, there inevitably results a much higher degree of culture. (*Division*, pp. 336-337).

Durkheim thus sets out an analysis of the division of labour which emphasizes the special functions of each of type of occupation and endeavour. The biological model, with a well functioning body, where each organ properly serves its function seems to be uppermost in Durkheim's mind. Unlike some of the structural functionalists, Durkheim's method distinguishes the cause of the function from the actual function filled. That is, Durkheim observes the function that the occupation fills in society, but attempts to investigate the development of the cause in an historical manner, examining how this function emerged. In this, one can consider there to be a certain "*conflict*" as a mechanism, within a quasi-Darwinian framework, which accelerates the progression of the division of labour." (Giddens, p. 79).

Durkheim is also providing a criticism of the economic models which argue that people with different specialties come together to trade the products of their specialties. For Durkheim, specialties are not natural in any sense, but are developed. Similarly, the division of labour is not natural either, but develops in different forms in different societies. While there may be a great similarity among these (perhaps like Weber's rationality), national differences emerge. In

that sense, Durkheim has an historical model, fairly solidly grounded on the material realities.

On the other hand, Durkheim's analysis may be considered to be mainly descriptive, proposing some fairly straightforward observations concerning culture. His notion of solidarity, mores, morals and norms come very close to the conventional sociological model of these, and may be considered to be widely accepted by all. The question is how these emerge, and whose interests they serve. Here the conflict approach differs dramatically from Durkheim.

Finally, Durkheim's analysis can be considered to be evolutionary and fairly optimistic. For the most part, Durkheim looks on the developments in the division of labour as signalling higher stages of civilization. He does not consider there to be any grand plan to this, and no single factor which guides it. Rather, there is competition, which results in the development of the division of labour, and the outcome of this process cannot be predicted. However, the result is generally positive, because people need each other, and this produces an organic solidarity in society.

Abnormal Forms of the Division of Labour

At the end of *The Division of Labor in Society*, however, Durkheim does note that there can be problems in society. There are two abnormal forms of the division of labour, and the division of labour itself does not always function as well as it could in modern society.

a. Anomic Division of Labor. When there are industrial and commercial crises, there may be a partial break in organic solidarity. Also, where there is conflict between capital and labour, this may be an unusual situation. Part of this is caused by the increased separation of employee and employer under capitalism (*Division*, p. 354), so that the conditions for a lack of solidarity are expanded as capitalism and the division of labour develop.

Irregular forms such as crime are not treated as part of the breakdown, rather these are treated by Durkheim as differentiation (*Division*, p. 353), not part of division of labour. Durkheim compares these with cancer, rather than with normal organs.

The real problem is a lack of regulation or a weakened common morality that can occur in modern society. For example, in the economic sphere, there are no rules which fix the number of economic enterprises (*Division*, p. 366), and there is no regulation of production in each branch of industry. This might be an overall form of irrationality, in Weber's sense. There can be ruptures in

equilibrium, capital labour relations may become indeterminate. In the scientific field there may be greater separation of different sciences. (*Division*, p. 367).

If the division of labour does not produce solidarity in all these cases, it is because the relations of the organs are not regulated, because they are in a state of *anomy*. For the individual this means there are not sufficient moral constraints and individuals do not have a clear concept of what is proper and acceptable. (Ritzer, p. 85). See Appendix quote 10:

Anomie. ... the state of *anomy* is impossible when solidary organs are sufficiently in contact or sufficiently prolonged. ... if some opaque environment is interposed, then only stimuli of a certain intensity can be communicated from one organ to another. Relations, being rare, are not repeated enough to be determined ... (*Division*, pp. 368-9).

Durkheim also discusses conditions of the worker under capitalism in terms that come very close to Marx's description of alienation and exploitation. He discusses the degrading nature of the division of labour on the worker, the possibility of monotonous routine, and the machine like actions of the worker. (*Division*, p. 371). However, Durkheim does not consider these to be the normal form, but one which results when the worker does not have a sufficient vision of the whole process of production.

... the division of labour does not produce these consequences because of a necessity of its own nature, but only in exceptional and abnormal circumstances. ... The division of labour presumes that the worker, far from being hemmed in by his task, does not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts upon them, and reacts to them. He is, then, not a machine who repeats his movements without knowing their meaning, but he knows that they tend, in some way, towards an end that he conceives more or less distinctly. (*Division*, p. 372).

b. Forced Division of Labor. The forced division of labour is where the division of labour is not allowed to develop spontaneously, and where some act to protect themselves and their positions. These could be traditional forms, which are external to the division of labour, or they could be castes, Weber's status groups, or Marx's classes. Any factors that prevent individuals from achieving positions which would be consistent with their natural abilities indicates a force division of labour. Ritzer notes (p. 98) that this could be inequalities in the structure of work or inadequate organization, with the wrong people in particular positions or incoherent organizational structures. Any interference with the operation of the division of labour that results in the

position being filled by those who are not most apt for the position would be forced division of labour. Quote 11:

Forced Division of Labour. We may say that the division of labour produces solidarity only if it is spontaneous and in proportion as it is spontaneous. ... In short, labor is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities. ... It consists, not in a state of anarchy which would permit men freely to satisfy all their good or bad tendencies, but in a subtle organization in which each social value, being neither overestimated nor underestimated by anything foreign to it, would be judged at its worth. (*Division*, p. 376).

Of course, wealth interferes with this, but Durkheim views this as abnormal and not the normal tendency.

even this last inequality, which comes about through birth, though not completely disappearing, is at least somewhat attenuated. Society is forced to reduce this disparity as far as possible by assisting in various ways those who find themselves in a disadvantageous position and by aiding them to overcome it." (*Division*, p. 379).

Role of State and Occupational Groups

Having said that Durkheim was generally very optimistic concerning the development of the division of labour in developing an organic solidarity, Durkheim was also concerned with the state of modern society. The development of the division of labour did have the tendency to split people, and the organic solidarity might not be sufficient to hold society together.

One solution for regulation that Durkheim discusses is the state. In some senses, Durkheim was a socialist, although not of the same type as Marx. Ritzer notes that for Durkheim, socialism "simply represented a system in which moral principles discovered by scientific sociology could be applied." (Ritzer, p. 73). While the principles of morality had to be present in society, the state could embody these in structures, fulfilling functions such as justice, education, health, social services, etc., and managing a wide range of sectors of society (Grabb, p. 87).

The state "should also be the key structure for ensuring that these rules are moral and just. The appropriate values of individualism, responsibility, fair

play, and mutual obligation can be affirmed through the policies instituted by the state in all these fields." (Grabb, p. 87).

The second major hope that Durkheim held was for what he called occupational groups. The state could not be expected to play the integrative role that might be needed, because it was too remote. As a solution, Durkheim thought that occupational or professional groups could provide the means of integration required. These would be formed by people in an industry, representing all the people in this sector. Their role would be somewhat different from Weber's parties, in that they would not be concerned with exercising power, and achieving their own ends. Instead, they would "foster the general interest of society at a level that most citizens can understand and accept." (Grabb, p. 88).

What we especially see in the occupational group is a moral power capable of containing individual egos, of maintaining a spirited sentiment of common solidarity in the consciousness of all the workers, of preventing the law of the strongest from being brutally applied to industrial and commercial relations. (p. 10). Ritzer notes that these associations could "recognize ... common interests as well as common need for an integrative moral system. That moral system ... would serve to counteract the tendency toward atomization in modern society as well as help stop the decline in significance of collective morality." (pp. 98-99).

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